Twelve years after its launch, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has shifted from a bold, high-profile geopolitical project into a more cautious, refined strategy. Initially envisioned as a modern-day “Silk Road” to connect China with Asia, Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America, the BRI promised to foster global trade, investment, and development partnerships. But over time, its ambitions have been tempered by economic realities, political backlash and growing international skepticism.
From hype to hesitation
Launched by President Xi Jinping in 2013, the BRI was marketed as a transformative initiative aimed at building infrastructure — highways, railways, energy pipelines, and deep-water ports — that would enhance global connectivity. At its height, it represented Beijing’s signature foreign policy tool and a symbol of its rising influence.
Cumulative Chinese engagement under the BRI has reached $1.3 trillion since 2013, with $775 billion in construction contracts and $533 billion in direct investment, according to data from the Green Finance and Development Center at Fudan University. Around 150 countries, accounting for roughly 40% of global GDP, signed on through formal agreements with China.
Yet the early momentum has faded. Critics argue that Beijing lured developing nations with promises of rapid development, only to saddle them with unsustainable debt and governance risks. Reports of corruption, inequality and environmental damage further tarnished the initiative’s image.
A shift in China’s strategy
Analysts say China has learned from these setbacks. Ilaria Mazzocco of the Center for Strategic and International Studies notes that Beijing has begun favoring “small but beautiful projects” over large, risky ventures.
“The BRI was characterized by very high-risk projects in countries with governance issues, which created debt and political problems for Beijing,” she said. In response, China has moved toward less risky investments in more stable markets, where Chinese companies can secure longer-term returns.
This evolution reflects Beijing’s more pragmatic stance: fewer prestige projects, more focus on sustainable outcomes.
Cracks in membership
Disenchantment with the initiative has become evident. Italy, the only G7 country to sign a BRI memorandum, withdrew in 2023 after finding limited trade benefits. Panama followed in 2025, bowing to U.S. pressure over concerns about Chinese influence around the Panama Canal.
China condemned Washington for “smear and sabotage,” while U.S. officials hailed Panama’s move as a geopolitical win. These high-profile exits underscore how strategic tensions have reshaped the program’s trajectory.
Successes and setbacks
Not all outcomes have been negative. Railways and roads built under the BRI, particularly in Southeast Asia, have improved trade and mobility. The China-Laos railway, launched in 2021, is credited with boosting cross-border commerce and tourism, and is slated to extend to Thailand and Singapore.
But other ventures highlight the pitfalls. Ecuador’s Coca Codo Sinclair hydroelectric dam, built by China’s Sinohydro, has faced allegations of corruption, environmental harm, and poor construction quality.
This duality — transformative local projects alongside troubled megaprojects — has defined the initiative’s mixed legacy.
Looking ahead
While the West often characterizes the BRI as “debt trap diplomacy,” many developing countries still view it as a lifeline amid scarce alternatives. As Mark A. Green, former U.S. ambassador and president emeritus of the Wilson Center, put it: “The best way to defeat BRI is to beat it — by offering developing countries genuine support for their national goals and aspirations.”
Twelve years on, the BRI is no longer the global juggernaut it once seemed. Instead, it has become a more cautious, scaled-down effort — one that still exerts influence, but in a quieter, more calculated manner.
